Friday, 27 September 2024

What Israel can learn from its 2006 ground invasion of Lebanon.

 Analysis

Extract from ABC News


A soldier covers his ears as a tank explodes

In 2006, Israel and Hezbollah went to war for 34 days.  (Reuters: Gil Cohen Magen)

Hundreds of civilians killed, rocket attacks on residential areas, a massive aerial bombardment and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.

These events are not just occurring today in Lebanon. 

They were exactly what happened the last time there was a war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006.

The war began when Israel responded to the kidnapping of two of its soldiers with a massive air and artillery bombardment and subsequent ground invasion.

The 34-day conflict that followed was ultimately considered a military failure by Israel.

However, the war fought between July and August 2006 did end with a ceasefire, one that led to 17 years of relative calm on the de facto border.

The many voices in Israel loudly opposing a ceasefire have either forgotten the lessons of 2006 or think this time will be significantly different.

What Israel wanted from a ground invasion in 2006

The 2006 invasion saw Israel's military kill 1,191 Lebanese people, "the vast majority civilians", according to Human Rights Watch.

A man holds his head while looking at rubble

Approximately 1,200 Lebanese people died and 4,400 were wounded, mostly civilians. (Reuters)

An estimated 43 Israeli civilians died from Hezbollah rocket fire into Israel, and about 120 soldiers were killed.

Israel began the 2006 conflict with four objectives, according to then-IDF chief of staff Dan Halutz: 

Like in 2024, Israel initially relied on a heavy air bombardment of Lebanese villages.

It also warned residents to evacuate, although many said they could not in time or did not want to.

Israel also bombed civilian infrastructure, including roads and bridges, and military infrastructure, such as radar stations belonging to the Lebanese Armed Forces, claiming they were being used to help Hezbollah.

Eventually, Israeli soldiers entered the south of Lebanon, a decision that was taken only after it became clear that the escalating bombardment was not going to achieve what Israel wanted.

Even then, the ground invasion failed to do that.

The situation now appears disturbingly similar.

Neither Hezbollah nor Israel claim to want a war, but they find themselves facing one.

As in 2006, Israel is acting as if the technological superiority of its air force and artillery can push Hezbollah back from the border and stop the rocket, drone and missile attacks that have forced the evacuation of Israel's northern residents.

That didn't work then and has so far failed again today.

Why Israel concluded its leaders 'failed completely' in 2006 

The failure of air power alone in 2006 left Israel with a ground invasion as its only remaining military option, a situation it might soon find itself in again.

This means it has failed to heed the harsh verdict delivered by a government inquiry, known as the Winograd Commission, into the 2006 Lebanon War.

Two men pass each other a thick document over a long table

Former Israeli Supreme Court Justice Eliyahu Winograd (left) led the commission of inquiry into the 2006 war.  (Reuters: Avi Ohayon)

"Israel initiated a long war, which ended without its clear military victory," the commission wrote in its report.

"If it is known in advance that there is neither the willingness nor an option for achieving such a victory, it is advisable to avoid launching a war a priori (presumptively) or even engaging in moves that might deteriorate into war.

"The government's most senior civilian and military leaders … failed completely to understand and internalise the fact that they had signed up, in effect, for a full-fledged war, not just a retaliatory operation."

Today, Israel is trying to stop Hezbollah firing rockets by bombing its weapons storage sites and killing its leaders.

It has arguably done far more damage to the group — particularly to its leadership — than ever before.

But in 2006, the inquiry concluded that aerial bombardment was never going to stop Hezbollah's rockets.

A group of people screaming and crying

Residents in the Israeli city of Haifa cry out in 2006 as sirens warn of an impending Hezbollah rocket.  (Reuters: Herzl Shapira)

"No effective response existed from the air to the short-range rocket fire," it said.

The commission was also scathing about the IDF's ground operations, saying ground forces and commanders were not well prepared.

The importance of a ceasefire in 2006

The war's outcome — the strongest military in the Middle East failing to defeat a non-state armed group — had far-reaching, negative strategic implications for Israel that its defence establishment is no doubt contemplating today.

The commission noted that the rockets only stopped when the ceasefire went into effect, not because of Israel's military operations.

That's a key point.

The inquiry concluded that military means did not solve Israel's problems — only a political agreement ended the threat to Israeli soldiers and civilians, a message many experts have been sending about both the Gaza and Lebanon conflicts today.

"At the end of the day, Israel did not gain a political achievement because of military successes; rather, it relied on a political agreement, which included positive elements for Israel, which permitted it to stop a war which it had failed to win," the Winograd Commission found.

Three soldiers holding an Israeli flag

Israeli soldiers leave Lebanese territory after the ceasefire was negotiated in August 2006.  (Reuters: Eliana Aponte)

The Commission asked Israel's society and leadership to go beyond examining the military and political failings of the war and consider what changes it must make to be a strong, socially robust and democratic society that is integrated into its region.

"These truths do not depend on one's partisan or political views," the Commission said.

"Israel must — politically and morally — seek peace with its neighbours and make necessary compromises."

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