Extract from ABC News
Analysis
The snow is melting, and both Russia and Ukraine are preparing for what is likely to be the most violent — and decisive — stage of this war.
For these two countries, the warming weather means the so-called "spring offensives" could be upon them. Both Russia and Ukraine are believed to be preparing for a new phase of the war.
On a visit I made to Ukraine in January there was a strong sense that the coming months will mean everything for Ukraine.
"Ukraine has one summer, and only one summer, to try to win this war," a former Australian military officer I met in Kyiv told me.
"After that, they cannot necessarily rely on the continued level of support from other countries that they're currently getting."
This view helps to explain the frantic international effort Ukraine has been making over recent months to get as many tanks and other hardware into their country before the snow melts.
Many Ukrainians believe their army will try to re-take Crimea on the rationale that this would deal such a propaganda blow to Russian President Vladimir Putin that it could precipitate a push against him.
Meanwhile, Russia has been taking dreadful human losses — far worse than Ukraine — and the effective canon fodder provided by the mercenary group Wagner Group, and its recruits from Russia's criminal and psychiatric prisons, can't go on forever.
In Ukraine, there's another concern. Many fear that should the Republicans reclaim the White House next year — particularly should Donald Trump be returned to power — support for Ukraine will quickly wane.
No one can know for sure what may happen in coming months. To get a sense of possible scenarios over the next year, I consulted three of Australia's leading Russia experts.
Peter Tesch: former Australian ambassador to Moscow
Peter Tesch, a former Australian ambassador to Moscow, says Ukraine has demonstrated that unity of purpose, deep resolve, skilful communications and military agility are potent assets even when confronting "the brutal and violent aggression of a numerically superior adversary".
So far, he says, Ukraine is winning on the battlefield and in the arena of global public opinion. "Russia is waging a war of attrition. History demonstrates the disdain which the Kremlin has always had for human casualties, whether its own or its adversaries, whether uniformed or civilian.
"Russia can subordinate other national policies and can assign national assets to its objectives in Ukraine without significant domestic repercussions."
Tesch says President Putin has used military force and violence to achieve Russian foreign policy goals before — in Georgia in 2008, in Ukraine in 2014, in Syria in 2015 — and was met with a relatively muted global reaction.
He has been surprised by the performance of the Russian army. "Like many others, I had believed that the Russian armed forces were more capable than they have shown themselves to be so far. I have been very surprised at the poor command and control and obvious inability of the Russian military to employ combined forces in properly integrated operations. Its kit also has not lived up to the expectations generated by Kremlin spin in recent years."
As for who is better placed to endure a long war, Tesch says Ukraine has "significant advantages". "It is defending its own territory against naked and incontestably unprovoked aggression — the Kremlin's shape-shifting and self-contradicting justifications for its actions notwithstanding," he says.
"The Ukrainian people know they are fighting for their liberty, their sovereignty, and their freedom to choose their own future — all of which President Boris Yeltsin guaranteed with his signature, alongside those of his UK, US and Ukrainian counterparts at the time of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.
"Western political and material support — led by the United States with substantial inputs from Europe, Canada, and Australia, amongst others — remains strong."
Economies are suffering in both countries
Tesch argues Putin's "ill-judged gambit" has eviscerated one of Russia's strongest strategic advantages — its energy leverage over Europe — which he believes it will never regain. "Moreover, for all its railing against so-called 'NATO expansionism', the Kremlin in fact is solely responsible for bringing NATO closer to it," he says.
"Putin's invasion has compelled Sweden and Finland — with overwhelming popular support — to abandon military neutrality and seek NATO membership. So far, I see no signs of Western wavering, but it will take firm will and resolve for this to endure in the face of competing domestic priorities as governments confront the ballot box in time."
Although casualty rates on both sides can only be estimated, Tesch says it is clear Russia has taken heavier losses than Ukraine — but it can "afford to, both in scale and because of the relative lack of accountability".
"Moreover, it is not Russian homelands that are being laid waste. I counsel against complacency and smugness, though. Russia has demonstrated throughout history an extraordinary capacity to rally national sentiment and resources, to absorb losses, and to endure hardships and tribulations that would sorely tax Western nations," he says.
"And Russia is now casting itself as being on the side of historical justice, bizarrely arguing that its war in Ukraine in fact is a stand against Western neo-colonialism which seeks to perpetuate a unipolar world rather than embrace the multipolarity which Russia avows."
If Russia gains traction with this thesis, he adds, it will be harder to sustain international opposition to the Kremlin.
"Both countries' economies are suffering. Ukraine is getting a heavier battering, but Russia's economy is also taking hits as sanctions remain in place and are expanded," Tesch says.
"The economic risk for Putin lies less in popular resentment — Russians have endured severe material hardship many times throughout history — than in the degradation of materiel support for his military aggression. Of course, some countries are conniving with Russia in circumventing sanctions, and they should be held to account for their profiteering and de facto support for Putin's predations."
Tesch argues that acquiescing in an enduring Russian occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory is not a hallmark of the "impressive leadership" that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has shown so far. In his assessment, Ukraine needs to show any waverers abroad that Western military support is being applied to good effect and must be sustained.
"I doubt that a single 'big push' by either side which would irrevocably alter the course and outcome of this war is likely. Rather, I think both sides will seek to regain momentum and military initiative," he says.
"Zelenskyy has publicly declared that the liberation of all occupied Ukrainian territory is his goal — that obviously includes Crimea. But I think there would be other, more achievable military goals for Ukraine in the near term."
Matthew Sussex: senior fellow at the Australian Defence College
Dr Matthew Sussex, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Defence Research at the Australian Defence College, says both sides are telling the best stories they can about winning.
"But you'd probably prefer to be telling the Ukrainian one," he says. "The Ukrainian armed forces have achieved something nothing short of astonishing. They've blunted the best units Russia can throw at them, held off an assault on Kyiv, and pushed the Russians back in a highly successful counteroffensive."
Is that winning? Sussex thinks so, but he says there's a long way to go yet.
"Ukraine is the party that has occupiers on its soil, not Russia. It remains vulnerable: Kyiv is reliant on continued international assistance, and it has suffered huge damage to its critical infrastructure. And taking back the rest of its territory will be a very tough ask," he says. "Yet it's unsurprising that Zelenskyy has doubled down on liberating all of Ukraine seized by Russia since 2013. That's a maximalist concept of victory, but anything less would see him out of a job fairly rapidly, I think."
What's more, a war that was "supposed to last three days" has now gone on for over a year, Sussex adds.
"Russia's armed forces have sustained enormous casualties, and the Kremlin has been forced to rely on semi-private military companies and waves of ill-trained conscripts. It has shot through the majority of its precision-guided weapons, appointed and fired numerous commanders, has committed 80 per cent of its total ground forces to the war, and yet it is still struggling to advance meaningfully," he says.
The only way Sussex imagines Putin can make a case that he's winning — absent a big turnaround from a spring offensive — is if he adjusts his war aims. "That means taking more or less what he has now, and destroying as much of Ukraine as he can.
"But at least it would allow him to declare victory for his new expanded Russian empire over what he maintains are Ukraine's fascists and their NATO enablers. And although that would still be pretty implausible, the bar for credibility is set much lower inside Russia than outside it."
Putin's leadership under the microscope
Sussex argues Russia has "more people to throw into the conflict" and more raw industrial capacity to sustain a long war effort.
"And certainly, Ukraine faces the bigger challenge of ensuring weapons from the West keep flowing. Being reliant on external coalitions is tricky, because you're always potentially dependent on its weakest link. The recent imbroglio about sending Leopard tanks to Kyiv was a good example," he says.
Still, he adds, there's currently no sign of Western governmental support for Ukraine dropping off: "If anything, it's recently strengthened considerably, and it is crucial that momentum is maintained".
"The Ukrainian troops are also far more committed to the fight, and the Ukrainian people have more to lose than Russian soldiers have to gain. Essentially Ukraine is fighting for national survival, while Russia's armed forces and conscripts are fighting for the imperial ambitions of their president."
That, Sussex argues, makes Russian domestic politics important. "The longer the war drags on, the more pressure even an autocrat like Putin will face, pressure to get results or get out of the way."
And if that is accurate, he says, it has both good and bad implications. "The more Putin feels threatened, the more it will increase his determination to fight on, but it also puts his leadership under the microscope in a way he hasn't experienced before.
"Clearly Putin has severely miscalculated the willingness of the West to aid Ukraine, in addition to the willingness of the Ukrainians to fight for their freedom. And even if Russia's armed forces are successful in grinding deeper into Ukraine, they're going to face a vicious insurgency that will make life very difficult for the occupying forces."
The economic dimension is also important, Sussex says. "While Ukraine's economy has been battered to the brink of collapse, things aren't going well for Russia either. The effect of Western price caps on energy and moratoria on oil/gas purchases will kick in hard this year. That will cause real pain since it isn't just a simple matter of Russia switching to China or India and others to make up the shortfall. Much of its energy infrastructure is fixed via pipelines — or in bits like Nord Stream 2 — and it lacks the capacity to pivot to new Asian clients at scale, via shipped LNG, for instance.
"There are also signs Moscow is aware of this, given that the Duma is reportedly considering amendments to legislation that will allow the government to withhold the release of key statistics."
Ian Parmeter: research fellow at the ANU
Ian Parmeter, a research fellow at the Australian National University and former counsellor at the Australian Embassy in Moscow, says the war seems to be at a stalemate.
"Neither side can be said to be winning in terms of its current objectives; Ukraine to drive Russian forces from every inch of its territory and Russia to push Ukrainian forces out of the four oblasts or provinces in eastern Ukraine — Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson — which Russia illegally annexed last year," he says.
"I don't think President Putin has abandoned his overall objective of regime change, or 'denazification', in Ukraine, but I would say he sees that now as a longer-term goal."
Russian forces, he says, are "well dug in" on the eastern sides of the four recently-annexed provinces and in full control of Crimea, annexed in 2014. "Incremental gains are occasionally made by each side, but often at significant cost in terms of casualties."
Parmeter says the mercenary group, Wagner, has been very important to Russia's efforts. "The US Department of Defense claimed in December 2022 that Wagner had 50,000 fighters in Ukraine, including 40,000 convicts," he says.
"Many of these have borne the brunt of the fighting and have reportedly taken many casualties. The founder of the group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, boasted that Wagner troops had 'won' the battle for the small town of Soledar in Donetsk oblast in early January — Russia's most significant victory in eastern Ukraine for several months."
In Parmeter's assessment, the longer the war continues, the more it will favour Russia. He says it's clear Putin miscalculated both the Ukrainian and Western responses when he invaded Ukraine and that the war would not end quickly.
"But he's personally invested in the war. He shows every sign of believing he can win. And he still seems convinced that Western resolve to keep supporting Ukraine will falter as the conflict joins the list of the US's 'forever' wars," he says.
Is the West giving Putin an 'off-ramp'?
In the US, Parmeter says, Republicans are far less supportive of the war than Democrats. "One right wing Republican, Congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, has called on the Biden Administration to stop funding Ukraine.
If Trump ... were to win in 2024, that would suit Putin perfectly. But even potential Republican candidate Ron DeSantis, generally regarded as more considered than Trump, has criticised Biden for providing an 'open-ended blank check' to Ukraine," he says.
Some in the US also worry that the Ukraine war is a "distraction" from preparations for what they see as an "inevitable war" with China over Taiwan, Parmeter says.
"The West's growing sanctions regime on Russia is unlikely to change Putin's mind. Only about 30 countries are implementing them, and the highly competent governor of Russia's Central Bank, Elvira Nabiullina, has managed so far to blunt their effect on Russians.
"Russia's economy contracted by just 2.1 per cent in 2022, according to official Russian statistics, defying a World Bank forecast that it would fall by over 11 per cent. Though the longer-term impact of continued sanctions is likely to be worse, Putin seems to believe Russia can weather them."
While he says some commentators have talked optimistically of the West providing Putin with an "off-ramp", he believes that's a "misreading". "Though Putin has said he is willing to negotiate, he has made clear that would be on his terms, including Ukrainian and Western acceptance of the regions Russia has annexed," Parmeter says.
"I believe he remains determined to prevail and still adheres to his original goal of changing the Ukrainian leadership to one subservient to Russia's interests. He would not accept an 'off-ramp' in any sense of ending the conflict. However, he might go along with a brief pause in the fighting, so that his forces can regroup and he can build up munition stocks for the next round."
A longer war, Parmeter says, does not favour Ukraine. "Continued Western support becomes more doubtful, and Ukraine cannot keep fighting without it. Ukrainians remain remarkably brave, resilient and determined. But the strains of continued Russian bombardments combined with the emotional impact of family separations must eventually take their toll."
The quality and morale of Russia's forces may not be as strong as Ukraine's, he adds, but the "sheer weight of numbers" favours Russia, whose population at 143 million is more than three times Ukraine's 44 million.
For Ukraine, victory could be a long time coming
Despite both sides talking of a spring offensive, Parmeter believes the pace of the war is likely to slow this year because each has been using up munitions at a fast rate.
"The US and Europe have their production of shells and other munitions geared to peace time needs and need time to ramp up production. Russian armament factories are reportedly working around the clock — including using sanctioned microchips cannibalised from western home goods that Kazakhstan imports on Russia's behalf," he says.
"Russia has reportedly reduced spending on health care and other social aspects of its budget in order to give more resources to its defence industry — a tactic that western countries obviously would not be able to emulate for political reasons. So Russia can probably rectify its munitions shortage sooner than western countries can Ukraine's. If China defies US warnings and starts to provide Russia with armaments and munitions from its own considerable stock, that will give Russia a further advantage."
Ukraine can keep fighting, Parmeter says, as long as the US and Europe continue to support it to the extent they are now doing. He says while western countries have promised continued support, public pressure is likely to grow on western governments to reduce their support if the war shows no sign of ending.
"It's in Ukraine's interest for the war to be as short as possible. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy said in his address marking the first anniversary of the start of the war that 2023 would be 'the year of our victory'. Leaders in wartime make statements like that, but how likely is that aspiration to be realised?" he says.
And if Ukraine sticks to its stated war aim of removing Russian forces from every inch of Ukrainian soil, including Crimea, Parmeter adds, victory could be a long time coming — if it comes at all.
"Even with continued Western armaments and training, victory in that sense is at least for now beyond Ukraine's capabilities," he says.
"Moreover, a prolonged war of attrition, as with the last two years of the Korean war, would be harder on Ukrainians than it would be on Russians. That's because the US has vetoed Ukraine taking the war onto Russian territory and because of the demoralising impact of constant Russian shelling of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure."
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