Extract from ABC News
Analysis
Warfare has always been a blend of physical violence and psychological influence.
In addition to the combat that takes place on the battlefield, and long-range strikes against strategic targets, the other battle that takes place in war is the battle of perceptions.
Belligerents attempt to influence how each other thinks in order to degrade the morale of combatants and civilians. They also seek to deceive enemy leaders about future intentions and to bolster their support from allies.
Ukraine has sought to generate the perception of national unity among its people, of its will to fight, and of the wider importance of its defence against an authoritarian aggressor.
Russia, on the other hand, has sought to generate the perception that its war is one of national survival as well, with Russian fighting off NATO expansion while also clearing Ukraine of "Nazis" and other threats to Russia.
It is important to understand the more prevalent perceptions among Western populations because these shape public opinion about the war. This, in turn, shapes the views of governments and their predisposition to assisting Ukraine with military, economic and humanitarian aid.
Four perceptions shaping opinions
Over the course of past 18 months, there are four perceptions about the war which have shaped opinion — and polls — around Western support for the Ukrainian government and the defence of their nation.
1. Russians are incompetent
The first perception, which emerged in the earliest days of the war, is that the Russians are incompetent.
This was born largely from Russian missteps in northern Ukraine in the first month of the war, and a massive quantity of videos on social media showing exploding tanks ("turret launching" became a popular online term).
There is no doubt that the Russian military — from the lowest levels on the battlefield to their strategic leadership — has made many missteps in the war.
But like all human organisations — even bad ones — Russia has also demonstrated the ability to learn and adapt. This has been a slow process, hindered by centralised command models and a fear of reporting failure.
Despite this, the Russians have improved their tactics, and evolved their strategy to embrace a "not lose while we wait out the West" approach.
So the perception of "incompetent Russians" is a dangerous one for the West. It denies agency to the Russians, assumes a lack of learning which isn't backed by facts, and has at times underpinned excessive optimism about a quick end to the war.
2. Ukrainian victory is inevitable
A second dangerous perception, related to the first, arose this time last year.
With the Ukrainians having defeated the Russians north of Kyiv, they then undertook offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson which liberated large portions of their territory.
While the boost in morale this provided for Ukrainians was crucial, it did generate in many Western populations a perception of inevitable Ukrainian victory in this war. This is as dangerous as the perception of Russian incompetence.
Wars never proceed in a straight line. They are non-linear, punctuated with success and defeat, pauses and pulses of activity. And while this may have led to good injections of military equipment for next year's Ukrainian offensives, this perception of inevitable Ukrainian victory, can lead to a lack of intellectual rigour in our analysis of the war. This is particularly true regarding the levels of support needed by Ukraine and the likely duration of the war.
The Ukrainians have achieved extraordinary things in the past 18 months, but no military force is invincible. Allowing such a perception to take hold can only hurt their chances of receiving badly needed foreign aid.
3. Rampant Ukrainian corruption
A third dangerous perception at the moment is of rampant Ukrainian corruption. Unfortunately, this is a perception that has some groundings in fact.
Before the war, in 2021, Transparency International ranked Ukraine as 122nd among all nations in corruption (Australia ranked 18th). The 2023 recruiting scandals, which saw President Volodymyr Zelenskyy remove dozens of senior recruiting officials, and the more recent changes in leadership in the Ministry of Defence, have reinforced for many the perception of endemic corruption in Ukraine.
It is a theme that some of those most opposed to Ukraine aid in the US Congress cling to, and that Russian misinformation campaign reinforce.
This is a very dangerous perception for the Ukrainians. It is something they must address openly (they are), and remove as an inhibitor to it's receipt of military and economic aid from abroad.
4. This is a European war
A final dangerous perception is that this is a European war.
There are some in Australia, in the United States and in what is now described as the "Global South" — including countries of Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania — who see this as just a European struggle.
But this "European war" perception is wrong and it is dangerous.
The war in Ukraine is actually shaping not just Europe but the global security and political environment for the 21st century. It is highlighting the differing characteristics of democracy and authoritarianism.
How the West supports Ukraine against Russia is being watched closely by other authoritarians like China. As US strategists Kathleen McInnis and Dan Fata have recently written, "waffling on Ukraine might actually make war with China more likely".
In war, battlefield results matter. But so do perceptions of results.
Deliberate misinformation campaigns, or insufficient attention to facts, is driving many different perceptions about the war in Ukraine. This is shaping public opinion and the policies of governments who are either supporting Ukraine or remaining on the sidelines.
In 21st century warfare, notions of victory will be informed by success on the battlefield, but also perceptions of success.
Mick Ryan is a strategist and retired Australian Army major general. He served in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, and as a strategist on the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is also a non-resident fellow of the Lowy Institute and at the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
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