Vladimir Putin sits atop a crumbling pyramid of power.

Extract from The Guardian

Opinion

Vladimir Putin

Vladimir Sorokin

Putin’s end goal isn’t Ukraine but western civilization – the hatred for which he lapped up in the black milk he drank from the KGB’s teat.

‘For Putin, life itself has always been a special operation.’

Sun 27 Feb 2022 18.14 AEDT

Last modified on Mon 28 Feb 2022 08.48 AEDT

On 24 February, the armor of the “enlightened autocrat” that had housed Vladimir Putin for the previous 20 years cracked and fell to pieces. The world saw a monster –crazed in its desires and ruthless in its decisions. The monster had grown gradually, gaining strength from year to year, marinating in its own absolute authority, imperial aggression, hatred for western democracy, and malice fueled by the resentment engendered by the fall of the USSR. Now, Europe will have to deal, not with the former Putin, but the new Putin who has cast aside his mask of “business partnership” and “peaceful collaboration”. There shall never again be peace with him. How and why has this come to pass?

In the final film of Peter Jackson’s The Lord of the Rings trilogy, when Frodo Baggins has to throw into the seething lava the cursed Ring of Power, the ring which has brought so much suffering and war to the inhabitants of Middle Earth, he suddenly decides to keep it for himself. And, by the will of the ring, his face suddenly begins to change, becoming evil and sinister. The Ring of Power had taken total possession of him. Even so, in Tolkien’s book, there’s a happy ending …

When Putin was put on the throne of Russian power by an ailing Boris Yeltsin in 1999, his face was rather sympathetic, attractive even – and his rhetoric was entirely sound. It seemed to many that the man ascending the heights of the Russian pyramid of power was an intelligent official devoid of pride and arrogance and a modern individual who understood that post-Soviet Russia had only one possible path into the future: democracy. He talked about democracy quite a bit in his interviews back then, promising the citizens of the Russian Federation continued reforms, free elections, freedom of speech, the observance of human rights by the authorities, cooperation with the west, and, most importantly, a constant rotation of those in power.

“I have no intention of holding onto this chair!” he said.

Vladimir Putin was put on the throne of Russian power by an ailing Boris Yeltsin in 1999. Photograph: AP

In Russia, as everyone knows, people still believe in the words and appearances woven by their rulers. And, back then, this man was “an individual pleasant in every respect”, as Nikolai Gogol wrote of his protagonist in Dead Souls: open to discussion, seeking to understand everyone, serious, but not devoid of humor or even the ability to make fun of himself.

Furthermore, certain politicians, intellectuals, and political theorists, who are now fierce opponents of Putin and his system, supported him, some of them even passing through the doors of his campaign headquarters to help him win the coming elections. And he did. But the fatal Ring of Russian Power was already on his finger and doing its insidious work; an imperial monster began to take the place of this handsome, lively individual.

In Russia, power is a pyramid. This pyramid was built by Ivan the Terrible in the 16th century – an ambitious, brutal tsar overrun by paranoia and a great many other vices. With the help of his personal army – the oprichnina – he cruelly and bloodily divided the Russian state into power and people, friend and foe, and the gap between them became the deepest of moats. His friendship with the Golden Horde convinced him that the only way to rule the hugeness of Russia was by becoming an occupier of this enormous zone. The occupying power had to be strong, cruel, unpredictable, and incomprehensible to the people. The people should have no choice but to obey and worship it. And a single person sits at the peak of this dark pyramid, a single person possessing absolute power and a right to all.

Paradoxically, the principle of Russian power hasn’t even remotely changed in the last five centuries. I consider this to be our country’s main tragedy. Our medieval pyramid has stood tall for all that time, its surface changing, but never its fundamental form. And it’s always been a single Russian ruler sitting at its peak: Pyotr I, Nicholas II, Stalin, Brezhnev, Andropov… Today, Putin has been sitting at its peak for more than 20 years. Having broken his promise, he clutches onto his chair with all his might. The Pyramid of Power poisons the ruler with absolute authority. It shoots archaic, medieval vibrations into the ruler and his retinue, seeming to say: “you are the masters of a country whose integrity can only be maintained by violence and cruelty; be as opaque as I am, as cruel and unpredictable, everything is allowed to you, you must call forth shock and awe in your population, the people must not understand you, but they must fear you.”

Judging by recent events, the idea of restoring the Russian Empire has entirely taken possession of Putin.

Judging by recent events, the idea of restoring the Russian Empire has entirely taken possession of Putin.

Alas, Yeltsin, who came to power on the crest of the wave of Perestroika, did not destroy the pyramid’s medieval form, he simply refurbished its surface: instead of gloomy Soviet concrete, it became colorful and was covered over with billboards advertising western goods. The Pyramid of Power exacerbated Yeltsin’s worst traits: he became rude, a bully, and an alcoholic. His face turned into a heavy, motionless mask of impudent arrogance. Toward the end of his reign, Yeltsin unleashed a senseless war onto Chechnya when it decided to secede from the Russian Federation. The pyramid built by Ivan the Terrible had succeeded in awakening the imperialist even in Yeltsin, only a short-lived democrat; as a Russian tsar, he sent tanks and bombers into Chechnya, dooming the Chechen people to death and suffering.

Yeltsin and the other creators of Perestroika surrounding him not only didn’t destroy the vicious Pyramid of Power, they didn’t bury their Soviet past either – unlike the post-war Germans who buried the corpse of their nazism in the 1950s. The corpse of this monster, which had annihilated tens of millions of its own citizens and thrown its country back 70 years into the past, was propped up in a corner: it’ll rot on its own, they thought. But it turned out not to be dead.

After coming to power, Putin began to change. And those who initially welcomed his reign gradually understood that these changes didn’t bode well for Russia. The TV channel NTV was destroyed, other channels began to pass into the hands of Putin’s comrades-in-arms, after which a regime of strict censorship came into effect; from that point forward, Putin was beyond criticism.

The flags of TVC Channel, Channel One and NTV Channel at the Ostankino TV Center. Photograph: Artyom Geodakyan/TASS

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of the richest and most successful company in Russia, was arrested and imprisoned for 10 years. His company Yukos was looted by Putin’s friends. This “special operation” was designed to intimidate the other oligarchs. And it did: some of them left the country, but the rest swore allegiance to Putin, some of them even becoming his “coin purses”.

The Pyramid of Power was vibrating and its vibrations stopped time. Like a huge iceberg, the country was floating through the past – first its Soviet past, then only its medieval past.

Putin declared that the collapse of the USSR was the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century. For all clear-headed Soviet people, its collapse had been a blessing; it was impossible to find a single family unscathed by the Red Wheel of Stalinist Repressions. Millions were annihilated. Tens of millions were poisoned by the fumes of communism – an unattainable goal requiring moral and physical sacrifices by Soviet citizens. But Putin didn’t manage to outgrow the KGB officer inside of him, the officer who’d been taught that the USSR was the greatest hope for the progress of mankind and that the west was an enemy capable only of corruption. Launching his time machine into the past, it was as if he were returning to his Soviet youth, during which he’d been so comfortable. He gradually forced all of his subjects to return there as well.

The perversity of the Pyramid of Power lies in the fact that he who sits at its peak broadcasts his psychosomatic condition to the country’s entire population

The perversity of the Pyramid of Power lies in the fact that he who sits at its peak broadcasts his psychosomatic condition to the country’s entire population. The ideology of Putinism is quite eclectic; in it, respect for the Soviet lies side by side with feudal ethics, Lenin sharing a bed with Tsarist Russia and Russian Orthodox Christianity.

Putin’s favorite philosopher is Ivan Ilyin – a monarchist, Russian nationalist, anti-Semite, and ideologist of the White movement, who was expelled by Lenin from Soviet Russia in 1922 and ended his life in exile. When Hitler came to power in Germany, Ilyin congratulated him hotly for “bringing the Bolshevization of Germany to a halt”. “I categorically refuse to evaluate the events of the last three months in Germany from the perspective of German Jews … The liberal-democratic hypnosis of non-resistance has been cast off …” he wrote. However, when Hitler declared the Slavs to be a second-class race, Ilyin was offended and the Gestapo soon took him into custody for the criticisms he’d begun to level. He was then rescued by Sergei Rachmaninov, after which he left for Switzerland.

In his articles, Ilyin hoped that, after the fall of Bolshevism, Russia would have its own great führer, who would bring the country up from its knees. Indeed, “Russia rising from its knees” is the preferred slogan of Putin and of his Putinists. It was also taking his cue from Ilyin that he spoke contemptuously of a Ukrainian state “created by Lenin”. In fact, the independent Ukraine was not created by Lenin, but by the Central Rada in January 1918, immediately after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by Lenin. This state arose because of Lenin’s aggression, but not thanks to his efforts. Ilyin was convinced that if, after the Bolsheviks, the authorities in Russia were “[to become] anti-national and anti-state, obsequious toward foreigners, [to dismember] the country, [to become] patriotically unprincipled, not exclusively protecting the interests of the great Russian nation without any regard for whorish Lesser Russians [Ukrainians], to whom Lenin gave statehood, then the revolution [would] not end, but enter its new phase of perishing from western decadence.”

“Under Putin, Russia has gotten up from its knees!” his supporters often chant. Someone once joked: the country got up from its knees, but quickly got down onto all fours: corruption, authoritarianism, bureaucratic arbitrariness, and poverty. Now we might add another: war.

A lot has happened in the last 20 years. The president of the Russian Federation’s face has turned into an impenetrable mask, radiating cruelty, anger, and discontent. His main instrument of communication has become lies – lies small and big, naively superficial and highly structured, lies he seems to believe himself and lies he doesn’t. Russians are already accustomed to their president’s lie-filled rhetoric. But, now, he’s also inured Europeans to those lies. Yet another head of a European country flies to the Kremlin so as to listen through their traditional portion of fantastical lies (now at an enormous, totally paranoid table), to nod their head, to say that “the dialogue turned out to be fairly constructive” at a press conference, then to just fly away.

Merkel admitted that, in her opinion, Putin lives in his own fantasy land. If that’s so, what’s the point of seriously engaging with such a ruler? He’s not a writer or an artist, he has to live in the real world and be responsible for every single one of his words. For 16 years, Merkel, who grew up in the GDR and should therefore understand Putin’s true nature, “has established a dialogue”. The results of that dialogue: the seizure of certain territories in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, the capture of the DPR and LPR, and now: a full-scale war with Ukraine. After the war with Georgia and the seizure of its territories, the “peacemaker” Obama offered Putin … a reset of their relations! Which is to say, c’mon, Vladimir, let’s forget all of that and start from scratch. The result of that “reset” was the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine.

Barack Obama meets with Vladimir Putin in Moscow on 7 July 2009. Photograph: Jim Young/Reuters

Putin’s inner monster wasn’t just brought up by our Pyramid of Power and the corrupt Russian elite, to whom Putin, like the tsar to the satraps, throws fat, juicy bits of corruption from his table.

It was also cultivated by the approval of irresponsible western politicians, cynical businessmen, and corrupt journalists and political scientists.

“A strong and consistent ruler!” This bewitched them. “A new Russian tsar” was, for them, something like Russian vodka and caviar: invigorating!

During this period of time, I met many admirers of Putin in Germany, from taxi drivers to businessmen and professors. One aged participant in the student revolution of ’68 confessed:

“I really like your Putin!”

“And why exactly is that?”

“He’s strong. Tells the truth. And he’s against America. Not like the slugs we’ve got here.”

“And it doesn’t bother you that, in Russia, there’s monstrous corruption, there are practically no elections or independent courts, the opposition is being destroyed, the provinces are impoverished, Nemtsov was murdered, and TV’s become propaganda?”

“No. Those are your internal affairs. If Russians accept all of that and don’t protest, that must mean they like Putin.”

Ironclad logic. The experience of Germany in the ’30s didn’t seem to have taught such Europeans anything.

But I hope most Europeans aren’t like that. That they know the difference between democracy and dictatorship – between war and peace. In his lie-filled address, Putin called the attack on Ukraine a “military special operation” against “Ukrainian aggressors”. Which is to say: the peace-loving Russia first annexed Crimea from the “Ukrainian junta”, then unleashed a hybrid war in eastern Ukraine, and is now attacking the whole country. Pretty much exactly like Stalin with Finland in ’39.

Now, one thing has become clear: with this war, Putin has crossed a line – a red line

For Putin, life itself has always been a special operation. From the black order of the KGB, he learned not only contempt for “normal” people, always a form of expendable matter for the Soviet Moloch-state, but also the Chekist’s main principle: not a single word of truth. Everything must be hidden away, classified. His personal life, relatives, habits – everything has always been hidden, overgrown with rumors and speculation.

Now, one thing has become clear: with this war, Putin has crossed a line – a red line. The mask is off, the armor of the “enlightened autocrat” has cracked. Now, all westerners who sympathize with the “strong Russian tsar” have to shut up and realize that a full-scale war is being unleashed in 21st-century Europe. The aggressor is Putin’s Russia. It will bring nothing but death and destruction to Europe. This war was unleashed by a man corrupted by absolute power, who, in his madness, has decided to redraw the map of our world. If you listen to Putin’s speech announcing a “special operation”, America and Nato are mentioned more than Ukraine. Let us also recall his recent “ultimatum” to Nato. As such, his goal isn’t Ukraine, but western civilization, the hatred for which he lapped up in the black milk he drank from the KGB’s teat.

Who’s to blame? Us. Russians. And we’ll now have to bear this guilt until Putin’s regime collapses. For it surely will collapse and the attack on a free Ukraine is the beginning of the end.

Putinism is doomed because it’s an enemy of freedom and an enemy of democracy. People have finally understood this today. He attacked a free and democratic country precisely because it is a free and democratic country. But he’s the one who’s doomed because the world of freedom and democracy is far bigger than his dark and gloomy lair. Doomed because what he wants is a new Middle Ages, corruption, lies, and trampling on human freedoms. Because he is the past. And we must do everything in our power to make this monster remain there – in the past – for all time, together with his Pyramid of Power.

• Vladimir Sorokin has written numerous novels, plays, short stories, and film scripts. His novels Telluria and Their Four Hearts, translated by Max Lawton, will be published this year

• This essay was translated by Max Lawton

Vladimir Putin puts Russia's nuclear forces on alert, as Ukraine agrees to talks with Russia.

Extract from ABC News

Posted 2 hours ago, updated 54 minutes ago

Vladimir Putin spoke on national television about putting the country's nuclear deterrence forces on high alert.(Reuters: Russian Pool)

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President Vladimir Putin has put Russia's nuclear forces on high alert in the face of a barrage of Western reprisals for his war on Ukraine, which said it had repelled Russian ground forces attacking its biggest cities.

Key points:

• Vladimir Putin put Russia's nuclear forces in a "special regime of combat duty"

• The office of Ukraine's president said a delegation would meet with Russian officials at an unspecified location on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border

• The US accused Putin of resorting to a pattern of manufacturing threats that don't exist in order to justify further aggression

The United States said Mr Putin was escalating the war in a "totally unacceptable" way, amid signs that the biggest assault on a European state since World War II was not producing rapid battlefield victories, but instead generating a far-reaching and concerted Western response.

The order means Mr Putin wants Russia's nuclear weapons prepared for increased readiness to launch.

"Western countries aren't only taking unfriendly actions against our country in the economic sphere, but top officials from leading NATO members made aggressive statements regarding our country," Mr Putin said in televised comments.

Shortly after the development, the office of Ukraine's President said a delegation would meet with Russian officials at the Belarus border.

The practical meaning of Mr Putin's order was not immediately clear.

Russia and the United States typically have the land and submarine-based segments of their strategic nuclear forces on alert and prepared for combat at all times, but nuclear-capable bombers and other aircraft are not.

If Mr Putin is arming or otherwise raising the nuclear combat readiness of his bombers, or if he is ordering more ballistic missile submarines to sea, then the United States might feel compelled to respond in kind, according to Hans Kristensen, a nuclear analyst at the Federation of American Scientists.

Threats part of Putin's pattern

However while Mr Putin's comments could be considered cause for concern, both Ukraine's Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba and White House press secretary Jen Psaki indicated they were simply an intimidation tactic aimed at scaring Ukraine.

"We see this announcement, this order, as an attempt to raise the stakes and to put additional pressure on the Ukrainian delegation. But we will not give in to this pressure," Mr Kuleba said.

Jen Psaki says Russia has not been under threat from NATO or Ukraine.(AP: Evan Vucci)

Ms Psaki said Mr Putin was resorting to a pattern he used in the weeks before launching the invasion of Ukraine, "which is to manufacture threats that don't exist in order to justify further aggression. The global community and American people should look at it through that prism. We've seen him do this time and time again."

Ms Psaki told ABC America that Russia was not under threat from NATO or Ukraine.

"This is all a pattern from President Putin and we're going to stand up … we have the ability to defend ourselves but we also need to call out what we're seeing here," Ms Psaki said.

Mr Putin threatened in the days before Russia's invasion to retaliate harshly against any nations that intervened directly in the conflict in Ukraine, and he specifically raised the spectre of his country's status as a nuclear power.

A Russian Yars intercontinental ballistic missile is launched during earlier exercises by nuclear forces in an unknown location in Russia.(Reuters: Russian Defence Ministry)

LIVE UPDATES: Read our blog for the latest on Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

The US ambassador to the United Nations responded to the news from Moscow while appearing on a Sunday news program.

"President Putin is continuing to escalate this war in a manner that is totally unacceptable," ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield told CBS.

"And we have to continue to condemn his actions in the strongest possible way."

Ukrainian and Russian officials to meet

Volodymyr Zelenskyy is expected to send others to the Belarus border for talks.(Reuters: Ukrainian Presidential Press Service)

Around the same time as Mr Putin's nuclear gambit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's office said on the Telegram messaging app that the two sides would meet at an unspecified location on the Belarusian border near the Pripyat River. 

The message did not give a precise time for the meeting.

It was not immediately clear who would represent the two sides at the talks.

Ukrainian media said Ukraine was sending Foreign Minister Mr Kuleba's deputy to the meeting

The announcement came hours after Russia announced that its delegation had flown to Belarus to await talks.

It also came after Mr Zelenskyy spoke to Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, in talks he described as "very substantive".

Ukrainian officials initially rejected the idea of holding talks in Belarus.

That country was one of the places from where Russian troops entered Ukraine.

Fighting continues across Ukraine

Strreet fighting broke out in Ukraine's second-largest city, Kharkiv, and Russian troops squeezed strategic ports in the country's south, advances that appeared to mark a new phase of Russia's invasion following a wave of attacks on airfields and fuel facilities elsewhere in the country.

Ukrainian soldiers set up defensive positions outside Kharkiv.(AP: Andrew Marienko)

Kharkiv's regional governor said that Ukraine was back in full control of its second-largest city after an earlier attack by Russian forces.

"Control over Kharkiv is completely ours," Oleh Sinegubov wrote in a Telegram message.

"The armed forces, the police, and the defence forces are working and the city is being completely cleansed of the enemy."

Journalists on the ground reported that without having eyes on the entire city, it appeared Ukraine had control of Kharkiv.

A woman walks near the mayor's office building during a curfew in Kyiv, Ukraine.(Reuters: Carlos Barria)

Earlier on Sunday, the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv was eerily quiet after huge explosions lit up the early morning sky and authorities reported blasts at one of the airports.

Only an occasional car appeared on a deserted main boulevard as a strict 39-hour curfew kept people off the streets. Terrified residents instead hunkered down in homes, underground garages and subway stations in anticipation of a full-scale Russian assault.

"The past night was tough – more shelling, more bombing of residential areas and civilian infrastructure," Mr Zelenskyy said.

Members of the Territorial Defence Forces of Ukraine prepare Molotov cocktails in Kyiv, Ukraine.(Reuters:: Mikhail Palinchak)

Ukrainians have volunteered en masse to help defend Kyiv and other cities, taking guns distributed by authorities and preparing petrol bombs to fight Russian forces.

On Sunday the city's mayor Vitaly Klitschsko said no Russian troops were in the city and saboteurs had been captured.

"There are no Russian troops in the capital, but our military [and] law enforcement ... continue to detect and neutralise saboteurs," Mr Klitschko said.

Ukrainians on social media amid Russian invasion

As millions shelter from Russian artillery and cruise missiles pounding Ukrainian cities, many are responding on social media with jokes and memes.

Read more

A Russian Defence Ministry spokesman, Major General Igor Konashenkov, said Russian forces had blocked the city of Kherson on the Black Sea and the port of Berdyansk on the Azov Sea.

He said the Russian forces also took control of an air base near Kherson and the Azov Sea city of Henichesk.

Ukrainian authorities also reported fighting near Odesa, Mykolaiv and other areas.

Number of casualties remains unclear

The number of casualties so far from Europe's largest land conflict since World War II remains unclear.

On Sunday the Russian military admitted for the first time that some of its troops had been killed or  wounded in Ukraine.

"There are dead and wounded among our comrades," Defence Ministry spokesman Major General Igor Konashenkov said.

He did not offer any numbers, but said Russia's losses were "many times" fewer than those of Ukraine.

Ukraine has claimed that its forces have killed 3,500 Russian troops.

Neither set of claims can be independently verified.

Ukraine's health minister reported on Saturday that 198 Ukrainians, including three children, had been killed and more than 1,000 others wounded. It was not clear whether this included military casualties.

The United Nations said it had confirmed at least 240 civilian casualties, including at least 64 people killed.

But it said the real figures would be "considerably higher" because many reports of casualties remained to be confirmed.

Fighting has been seen across major cities, including the capital Kyiv.

Ukraine's UN ambassador, Sergiy Kyslytsya, tweeted on Saturday that Ukraine appealed to the International Committee of the Red Cross "to facilitate repatriation of thousands of bodies of Russian soldiers".

Laetitia Courtois, the International Committee of the Red Cross's permanent observer to the UN, said the situation in Ukraine was "a limitation for our teams on the ground" and "we therefore cannot confirm numbers or other details."

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced his country was increasing spending for its armed forces.(AP: Michael Sohn)

West sending military assistance to Ukraine

As Russia pushed ahead with its offensive, the West was working to equip the outnumbered Ukrainian forces with weapons and ammunition while punishing Russia with far-reaching sanctions intended to further isolate Moscow.

The US pledged an additional $US483 million in military assistance to Ukraine, including anti-tank weapons, body armour and small arms.

Germany said it would send missiles and anti-tank weapons to the besieged country and would close its airspace to Russian planes.

The US, European Union and United Kingdom agreed to block "selected" Russian banks from the SWIFT global financial messaging system, which moves money around more than 11,000 banks and other financial institutions worldwide, part of a new round of sanctions aiming to impose a severe cost on Moscow for the invasion.

They also agreed to impose "restrictive measures" on Russia's central bank.

Responding to a request from Ukraine's minister of digital transformation, tech billionaire Elon Musk said on Twitter that his satellite-based internet system Starlink was now active in Ukraine and that there were "more terminals en route."

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, meanwhile, said his country was committing 100 billion euros ($155 billion) to a special fund for its armed forces, raising its defence spending above 2 per cent of gross domestic product.

Mr Scholz told a special session of the Bundestag the investment was needed "to protect our freedom and our democracy."

ABC/wires

The Cossacks of Ukraine

Extract from Encyclopedia Britannica

 In the 15th century a new martial society—the Cossacks (from the Turkic kazak, meaning “adventurer” or “free man”)—was beginning to evolve in Ukraine’s southern steppe frontier. The term was applied initially to venturesome men who entered the steppe seasonally for hunting, fishing, and the gathering of honey. Their numbers were continually augmented by peasants fleeing serfdom and adventurers from other social strata, including the nobility. Banding together for mutual protection, the Cossacks by the mid-16th century had developed a military organization of a peculiarly democratic kind, with a general assembly (rada) as the supreme authority and elected officers, including the commander in chief, or hetman. Their centre was the Sich, an armed camp in the lands of the lower Dnieper “beyond the rapids” (za porohy)—hence, Zaporozhia (in contemporary usage, Zaporizhzhya).

The Cossacks defended Ukraine’s frontier population from Tatar incursions, conducted their own campaigns into Crimean territory, and, in their flotillas of light craft, even raided Turkish coastal cities in Anatolia. The Polish government found the Cossacks a useful fighting force in wars with the Tatars, Turks, and Muscovites but in peacetime viewed them as a dangerously volatile element. Attempts to control them institutionally and to limit their numbers through an official register created serious discontent among the Cossacks, who increasingly perceived themselves as forming a distinct estate with inherent rights and liberties. Sporadically over a half century starting in 1591, the Cossacks rose up in revolts that were put down only with great difficulty.

In the first half of the 17th century, the Cossacks also became involved in the raging religious conflict. In 1620 the entire Zaporozhian host joined the Kyivan Orthodox brotherhood; in the same year, a new Orthodox hierarchy was consecrated in Kyiv under their military protection. Thus, in the great religious divide, the Cossacks became identified with staunch support of Orthodoxy and uncompromising opposition to the Uniate church. Under the protection afforded by the Cossacks and the dynamic leadership of a new metropolitan of Kyiv, Peter Mogila (Ukrainian: Petro Mohyla), Orthodoxy flourished in Ukraine; it became the driving force behind a cultural revival that included the establishment of the Kyivan Mohyla Academy, the first Ukrainian institution of higher learning.

The Khmelnytsky insurrection

Tensions stemming from social discontent, religious strife, and Cossack resentment of Polish authority finally coalesced and came to a head in 1648. Beginning with a seemingly typical Cossack revolt, under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ukraine was quickly engulfed in an unprecedented war and revolution.

Khmelnytsky was a petty nobleman and Cossack officer who, unable to obtain justice for wrongs suffered at Polish hands, fled to the Sich in late 1647 and was soon elected hetman. In early 1648 he began preparations for an insurrection, securing for this purpose Tatar military support. A Polish army sent into Ukraine to forestall the rebellion was shattered in two battles in May. This victory gave signal to a massive popular uprising. Violence spread throughout Ukraine as Cossacks and peasants vented their fury on those they associated with Polish tyranny and social oppression—landlords, officials, Latin and Uniate clergy, and Jews. The Poles in turn took bloody reprisals against the rebellious population. In September Khmelnytsky inflicted another crushing defeat on a newly raised Polish army, marched westward through Galicia, and finally besieged Zamość in Poland proper. He did not press his advantage, however, and, with the election of a new Polish king in November, he returned to central Ukraine. In January 1649 Khmelnytsky entered Kyiv to triumphal acclaim as liberator.

Although initially seeking only a redress of grievances from the Polish crown, Khmelnytsky, following his arrival in Kyiv, began to conceive of Ukraine as an independent Cossack state. He set about establishing a system of government and state finances, created a local administration under a new governing elite drawn from the Cossack officers, and initiated relations with foreign states. Still prepared to recognize royal sovereignty, however, he entered into negotiations with the Poles. But neither the Treaty of Zboriv (August 1649) nor a less favourable agreement two years later proved acceptable—either to the Polish nobility or to the Cossack rank and file and the radicalized masses on the Ukrainian side.

While military operations continued inconclusively, and because Tatar support proved undependable at crucial moments, Khmelnytsky began to search for other allies. In 1654 at Pereyaslav he concluded with Moscow an agreement whose precise nature has generated enormous controversy: Russian historians have emphasized Ukraine’s acceptance of the tsar’s suzerainty, which subsequently legitimized Russian rule, but Ukrainian historiography has stressed Moscow’s recognition of Ukraine’s autonomy (including an elective hetmancy, self-government, and the right to conduct foreign relations) that was virtually tantamount to independence (see Pereyaslav Agreement). Moscow now entered the war against Poland. No decisive breakthrough occurred, however, despite occasional joint victories, and Khmelnytsky became increasingly disillusioned with the Muscovite alliance. There were disputes over control of conquered territory in Belarus and conflicts over Russian interference in internal Ukrainian affairs. Especially galling to the hetman was the Russo-Polish rapprochement that followed the invasion in 1655 of Poland by Sweden, Moscow’s adversary but Ukraine’s potential ally (see First Northern War). Khmelnytsky again cast about for new alliances and coalitions involving Sweden, Transylvania, Brandenburg, Moldavia, and Walachia, and there were indications that the hetman planned to sever the Muscovite connection but died before he could do so.

The Ruin

Khmelnytsky’s successor, Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, broke with Moscow and in 1658 concluded the new Treaty of Hadyach with Poland. By its terms, central Ukraine (attempts to include Volhynia and Galicia were unsuccessful) was to constitute—under the hetman and a ruling elite of nobles and officers—the self-governing grand duchy of Rus, joined with Poland and Lithuania as an equal member of a tripartite commonwealth. Distasteful to the Polish magnates for its concessions to the hated Cossacks, repugnant to the Cossacks and the peasant masses for its conservative social cast and Polish connection, and a provocation to Moscow, the Treaty of Hadyach was never implemented. Faced with mounting opposition, Vyhovsky resigned the hetmancy and fled to Poland.

After Vyhovsky, Ukraine began a rapid descent into a prolonged state of chaos that contemporaries called “the Ruin.” Tensions increased between the Cossack officers, who were undergoing a transformation into a hereditary landowning class, and rank-and-file Cossacks and the peasantry, who were the expected supply of labour. From 1663, rival hetmans rose and fell in the competing Polish and Russian spheres of influence. In 1667, by the Truce of Andrusovo, Ukraine was partitioned along the Dnieper River: the west, known as the Right Bank, reverted to Poland, while Russia was confirmed in its possession of the east, known as the Left Bank, together with Kyiv (which actually was located west of the river); the arrangement was confirmed in 1686 by the Treaty of Eternal Peace between Poland and Russia.

The partition of Ukraine caused a patriotic reaction. The hetman of the Right Bank, Petro Doroshenko, briefly occupied the Left Bank and sought to re-create a unified Ukrainian state under the vassalage of the Ottoman Empire. A massive Ottoman military intervention in 1672 had as its primary effect the outright annexation of Podolia as an Ottoman province for a quarter century. Doroshenko’s hopes—and popularity—evaporated as further Ottoman operations failed to establish his rule and led to devastation, especially after Russia was drawn into the war. Mass flight of the populace to the Left Bank, and even beyond, depopulated large tracts of Right Bank Ukraine. Two large-scale Ottoman campaigns followed Doroshenko’s abdication, but a truce in 1681 put an end to further direct Turkish military involvement. Ottoman power was soon on the wane in Europe, and in 1699 the province of Podolia reverted to Polish rule.

The autonomous hetman state and Sloboda Ukraine

After the partition of 1667, the autonomous hetman state, or Hetmanate, was limited territorially to the east, in Left Bank Ukraine. (The hetman state in Right Bank Ukraine, under at least nominal Polish control, was abolished by the Poles at the turn of the 18th century.) At the head of the state stood the hetman, elected theoretically by a general Cossack assembly but in effect by senior officers, who in turn were largely swayed by the tsar’s preference. The terms of autonomy were renegotiated at each election of a new hetman, and this led over time to a steady erosion of his prerogatives. Nevertheless, for a century the Hetmanate enjoyed a large measure of self-government, as well as considerable economic and cultural development.

The ruling elite in the Hetmanate was composed of the senior Cossack officers, starshyna, who had evolved into a hereditary class approximating the Polish nobility in its privileges. The common Cossacks too were undergoing stratification, the more impoverished hardly distinguished, except in legal status, from the peasantry. The conditions of the free peasantry worsened over time, their growing obligations tending increasingly toward serfdom. Urban life flourished, however, and the larger cities and some towns continued to enjoy municipal self-government; the burghers largely maintained the rights of their social estate.

In the ecclesiastical realm, the Uniate church disappeared from the Cossack-controlled territory, and the Orthodox Kyivan metropolitanate itself was transferred in 1686 from the patriarchal authority of Constantinople to that of Moscow. Although Ukrainian churchmen eventually gained enormous influence in Russia, within the Hetmanate itself in the course of the 18th century the church progressively lost its traditional autonomy and distinctive Ukrainian character.

The hetman state reached its zenith in the hetmancy of Ivan Mazepa. Relying at first on the support of Tsar Peter I (the Great), Mazepa exercised near monarchical powers in the Hetmanate. Literature, art, and architecture in the distinctive Cossack Baroque style flourished under his patronage, and the Kyivan Mohyla Academy experienced its golden age. Mazepa aspired to annex the Right Bank and re-create a united Ukrainian state, initially still under the tsar’s sovereignty. But Peter’s centralizing reforms and the exactions imposed on the Hetmanate in connection with the Second Northern War appeared to threaten Ukrainian autonomy. In 1708, in furtherance of his plans for independence, Mazepa made a secret alliance with Charles XII of Sweden, but in the decisive Battle of Poltava (1709) their allied forces were defeated. Mazepa fled to Moldavia, where he died shortly thereafter.

Although Peter allowed the election of a successor to Mazepa, the Hetmanate’s autonomous prerogatives were severely curtailed and underwent further weakening over the remaining decades of the 18th century. From 1722 to 1727 and again from 1734 to 1750, the office of hetman was in abeyance, as the Russian imperial regime introduced new institutions to oversee the country’s governance. In 1750 Empress Elizabeth revived the hetmancy for Kyrylo Rozumovsky, the brother of her favourite. On the accession of Catherine II (the Great) in 1762, the hetman and the starshyna petitioned for the restoration of the Hetmanate’s previous status; instead, in 1764 Catherine forced Rozumovsky’s resignation. Over the next 20 years all vestiges of Ukrainian autonomy were eliminated, and in 1775 the Zaporozhian Sich, the bastion of the Cossacks, was destroyed by Russian troops.

To the east of the Hetmanate lay lands that until the 17th century had remained largely unpopulated—part of the “wild fields” since the Mongol invasion. Into this area, starting in the late 16th century, the Muscovite government gradually extended its line of fortifications against the Tatars. In the 17th century this territory became an area of colonization by Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks fleeing Polish rule and, later, the ravages of the Ruin period. The newcomers established free, nonserf settlements called slobodas that gave the area the name of Sloboda Ukraine. Kharkiv developed into the region’s main centre. Like the Hetmanate, Sloboda Ukraine enjoyed extensive internal autonomy, though under officials appointed by the Russian imperial government. The autonomy of Sloboda Ukraine was abolished under Catherine in 1765.

Right Bank and western Ukraine until the Partitions of Poland

The western Ukrainian lands of Galicia and Volhynia, though part of the theatre of war during the Khmelnytsky insurrection, remained in its aftermath still firmly under Polish control. The Right Bank, after the abatement of the Ruin and the retrocession of Podolia by the Turks, also reverted to Polish sovereignty. However, only in 1714, after further dislocations connected with the Second Northern War, was control reestablished over the area by a greatly weakened Poland.

The society that reemerged in Ukrainian territories under Polish rule in the 18th century differed markedly from that in the Hetmanate. The Cossacks virtually disappeared as a significant organized force. Cities and towns experienced a serious decline, and their populations became more heavily Polish and, especially in the Right Bank, Jewish. Roman Catholicism maintained and even enhanced its earlier privileged status; the Uniate church, however, became predominant among Ukrainians, with Orthodoxy claiming a smaller number of adherents.

In the absence of strong central authority and with the elimination of the Cossacks as a countervailing force, the Right Bank was dominated by the Polish nobility. Especially influential were a few magnate families whose huge estates formed virtually independent fiefdoms, with their own privately armed militias. The desolated lands were slowly repopulated through peasant migrations (frequently organized by the nobility) from Galicia and, especially, Volhynia. The extreme exploitation of the enserfed peasantry bred discontent that led sporadically to uprisings by bands of rebels called haydamaks (Turkish: “freebooters” or “marauders”). The most violent, known as the Koliivshchyna, occurred in 1768 and was put down only with the help of Russian troops.

Polish rule in Ukrainian territories came to an end with the extinction of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in three partitions—in 1772, 1793, and 1795 (see Partitions of Poland). In the first partition, Galicia was annexed by Habsburg Austria. In the second, Russia took the Right Bank and eastern Volhynia; it absorbed the rest of Volhynia in the third.

Ukraine under direct imperial Russian rule

Following the abolition of autonomy in the Hetmanate and Sloboda Ukraine and the annexation of the Right Bank and Volhynia, Ukrainian lands in the Russian Empire formally lost all traces of their national distinctiveness. The territories were reorganized into regular Russian provinces (guberniyas) administered by governors appointed from St. Petersburg. The Right Bank, along with some adjoining territories, formed part of the Pale of Settlement, to which the Jewish population of the empire was residentially restricted (see pale). With the liquidation of the Sich and the annexation of the Crimean khanate in 1783, the sparsely settled southern lands (named Novorossiya, or New Russia) were colonized by migrants from other parts of Ukraine, as well as smaller numbers from Russia, the Balkans, and Germany. This colonization movement greatly expanded Ukrainian ethnic territory. The new Black Sea port of Odessa (Odesa) grew into a large and cosmopolitan metropolis.

Equally important developments occurred in the social sphere. As compensation for their lost rights as a ruling elite in the Hetmanate, the Cossack starshyna were equalized with the Russian nobility; many entered imperial service, and some achieved the highest government ranks. Through education, intermarriage, and government service, the Ukrainian nobility gradually became Russified—as the earlier Ruthenian nobility had been Polonized—though many retained a sentimental attachment to the land and its folklore. The Polish nobility in the Right Bank continued as the dominant landowning class, although its status eroded over time, particularly after the Polish insurrections of 1830–31 and 1863–64 (see November Insurrection; January Insurrection). The large Jewish population was bound by numerous legal disabilities and, from 1881, victimized by recurrent waves of pogroms. The gradual process of enserfment of the peasantry in the Left Bank culminated in 1783 under Catherine II. The obligations there, however, were less onerous than in the Right Bank. Agitation among the peasant class, coupled with the Russian defeat in the Crimean War (1853–56), hastened the decline of serfdom, but it remained the dominant lot of the peasantry until the emancipation of 1861. After emancipation, the peasants were still burdened by inadequate land allotments and heavy redemption payments that led to the impoverishment of many.

Nevertheless, the reforms stimulated the development of industry within the Russian Empire by releasing labour from the land. Industrial development was especially marked in eastern Ukraine, notably the Donbas region (Donets Basin). However, the workers attracted to the growing metallurgical industry and other industrial concerns generally came from other parts of the empire; the Ukrainian population seeking economic improvement more commonly emigrated to agricultural lands. As a result, the emerging working class and the growing urban centres in Ukraine became highly Russified islands in a Ukrainian rural sea.

As in the political and social realms, in religious policy the tsarist regime promoted the elimination of Ukrainian peculiarities. Although the largely Polish Roman Catholic Church was allowed to continue, Catherine launched a program of administrative conversion of Ukrainians from the Uniate church. The anti-Uniate campaign was partially reversed by her immediate successors but was renewed with vigour by Nicholas I. In 1839 the Uniate metropolitanate was abolished, the Union of Brest-Litovsk declared null and void, and the Uniates finally absorbed into the Russian Orthodox Church, while the recalcitrant clergy were harshly punished. The Russian Orthodox Church became an important vehicle for the Russification policies of the imperial regime in Ukraine.

In the 19th century the development of Ukrainian cultural life was closely connected with academic circles. The first modern university in Ukraine was established in 1805 at Kharkiv, and for 30 years Sloboda Ukraine was the major centre for Ukrainian scholarship and publishing activities. In 1834 a university was founded in Kyiv and in 1865 at Odessa. Though Russian institutions, they did much to promote the study of local history and ethnography, which in turn had a stimulative effect on the Ukrainian national movement.

Literature, however, became the primary vehicle for the 19th-century Ukrainian national revival. The most important writer—and unquestionably the most significant figure in the development of a modern Ukrainian national consciousness—was Taras Shevchenko. Born a serf, Shevchenko was bought out of servitude by a group of artists who recognized his talent for painting. Though considered by many to be the father of modern Ukrainian painting, Shevchenko made his unique mark as a poet. His poetry spanned themes from the fantastic in folklike ballads to epic romanticization of Cossack glory, from wrathful indictments of social and national oppression under the tsars to mystical reflections based on the biblical prophets. Apart from its seminal impact on the subsequent course of Ukrainian literature, Shevchenko’s poetry reflected a conception of Ukraine as a free and democratic society that had a profound influence on the development of Ukrainian political thought.

By the mid-19th century the cultural and literary stirrings in Ukraine aroused concern in tsarist ruling circles. In the official view, dominant also in Russian historiography, the Ukrainians were a subdivision, or “tribe,” of Russians—“Little Russians”—torn from the unity of Rus by the Mongol-Tatars and deflected from their proper historical course by the baneful influence of Poland. Thus, it was deemed essential to reintegrate Ukraine fully into the Russian body politic. Shevchenko’s patriotic verse earned him arrest and years of exile in Central Asia. In 1863 the minister of the interior, Pyotr Valuev, banned virtually all publications in Ukrainian, with the exception of belles lettres. The ban was reinforced by a secret imperial decree, the Ems Ukaz, of Alexander II in 1876 and extended to the publication of belles lettres in Ukrainian, the importation of Ukrainian-language books, and public readings and stage performances in the language. The prohibition even extended to education—a major contributing factor to the low rate of literacy among Ukrainians (only 13 percent in 1897). With such restrictions, writers from Russian-ruled Ukraine could see their works published only in Austrian Galicia, and many figures in the national movement shifted their activities there.

Tsarist repression and the still premodern, largely rural character of Ukrainian society in the Russian Empire impeded the growth of a political movement. A secret society, the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, existed briefly in 1845–47. Its program advocated social equality, an end to national oppression, and a federation of Slavic states under the leadership of Ukraine. The brotherhood was quickly uncovered and suppressed and its leaders arrested and punished. In the second half of the 19th century, clandestine societies called hromadas (“communities”) were formed in various cities to promote Ukrainian culture, education, and publishing under conditions of illegality. Originally associated with the Kyiv hromada was the leading political thinker of the time, Mykhaylo Drahomanov, who advocated the transformation of the tsarist empire into a federative republic in which Ukrainian national rights would be assured. Toward the end of the century, younger, primarily student-led hromadas became involved in more overtly political activities. One such group in Kharkiv developed into the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party, which in a pamphlet published in 1900 advanced for the first time as a political goal “one, single, indivisible, free, independent Ukraine.”

The revolution that shook the Russian Empire in 1905 spawned worker strikes and peasant unrest in Ukraine as well (see Russian Revolution of 1905). The consequent transformation of the tsarist autocracy into a semiconstitutional monarchy led to some easing in Ukrainian national life. The ban on Ukrainian-language publishing lapsed, and societies to foster popular enlightenment and scholarship proliferated, as did theatrical troupes and musical ensembles. Nevertheless, the population affected by these cultural endeavours remained small, and the Ukrainian language was still excluded from schools.

In the political arena the introduction of an elected assembly, or Duma, in 1906 initially provided Ukrainians with a new forum to press their national concerns. In the short-lived First and Second Dumas, Ukrainians had a sizable representation and formed their own caucus. Changes in the electoral law to the detriment of the peasantry and national minorities, however, severely limited Ukrainian representation and effectiveness in the Third and Fourth Dumas. Until the Russian Revolution of 1917, the agenda of nationally conscious, politically active Ukrainians seldom exceeded demands for language and cultural rights and some form of local autonomy.

Western Ukraine under the Habsburg monarchy

The Habsburgs’ annexation of Galicia from Poland in 1772 was followed two years later by their acquisition of Bukovina, a partly Ukrainian (predominantly in its northern reaches) and partly Romanian territory, from Moldavia. Already under Habsburg rule, as part of the Hungarian crown, was a third ethnically Ukrainian region—Transcarpathia. Within the Habsburg realm these three territories underwent many experiences in common, but they were distinguished also by differences stemming from their specific ethnic environments and earlier histories.

Galicia

Under Austria, ethnically Ukrainian Galicia was joined administratively with purely Polish areas to its west into a single province, with Lviv (German: Lemberg) as the provincial capital. This and the fact that, in the province’s Ukrainian half, the Poles constituted overwhelmingly the landlord class and dominated the major cities (though many towns were largely Jewish) made Polish-Ukrainian rivalry a crucial feature of Galician life. Although, on balance, Habsburg policies favoured the Poles, Ukrainians (Ruthenians in the contemporary terminology) in Austria enjoyed far greater opportunities for their national development and made far greater progress than did Ukrainians in tsarist Russia.

The reforms initiated by the Austrian rulers Maria Theresa and Joseph II and the introduction of the imperial bureaucracy in Galicia improved the position of Ukrainians. The peasantry benefited from the limitation of the corvée and the abolition of personal bondage to the landlord in the 1780s, as well as from new methods in agriculture promoted by the “enlightened monarchs.” Municipal reforms reversed the decline of cities and led to an improvement in the legal and social position of the Ukrainian urban population. Undertaken as early as 1775, educational reforms allowed for instruction in the native language, although in practice Ukrainian-language teaching was limited largely to low-level parochial schools until the mid-19th century.

The fortunes of the Uniate church also rose. Renamed the Greek Catholic church in 1774, it was, by imperial decree, equalized in status with the Roman Catholic Church, and in 1807 a metropolitanate was established, with its seat in Lviv. Imperial authorities took pains to raise the educational standards of the clergy. In the early decades of the 19th century, the clergy trained at newly established institutions almost exclusively formed the educated class, and their children, beginning to enter secular professions, gave rise to a Ukrainian intelligentsia. In the course of the 19th century, the Greek Catholic church became a major national, as well as religious, institution.

The revolution of 1848 that swept the Austrian Empire politicized the Ukrainians of Galicia (see Revolutions of 1848). The Supreme Ruthenian Council, established to articulate Ukrainian concerns, proclaimed the identity of Austria’s Ruthenians with the Ukrainians under Russian rule; demanded the division of Galicia into separate Polish and Ukrainian provinces, the latter to include Bukovina and Transcarpathia; organized a national guard and other small military units; and published the first Ukrainian-language newspaper.

Although suppressed, the revolution set in motion important transformations in Galician society. The corvée was abolished in 1848. Impoverishment of the Ukrainian peasantry increased, however, due to lack of land reform, rural overpopulation, and a near total absence of industry to absorb the excess labour force. Large-scale emigration to the Americas (specifically the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina) began in the 1880s and continued until World War I.

Also in the aftermath of the 1848 revolution, the imperial regime reached an accommodation with the Polish nobility that in effect ceded political control of Galicia to the Poles. The local Polish hegemony was little affected by the reforms of the 1860s that gave Austria a constitution and parliament and Galicia its provincial autonomy and diet. The governors appointed by Vienna were exclusively Polish aristocrats. The civil service and Lviv University, which had been Germanized in the early years of Habsburg rule, were Polonized. Elections to the parliament and diet inevitably produced commanding Polish majorities, as voting was based on a curial system that favoured the landowning and urban classes. (Curiae were the political groups, representing various communities and classes of people, that cast the votes.) The occasional efforts by imperial authorities to promote a Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation failed to gain more than minor concessions in the fields of culture and education. The major demands of Ukrainian parliamentary representatives—including the partition of Galicia along ethnic lines, the replacement of the curial electoral system by universal suffrage, and the creation of a Ukrainian university in Lviv—were not met.

Disappointment with the Habsburgs and concern over the new Polish ascendancy gave rise in the 1860s to pro-Russian sympathies among the older, more conservative, clerical intelligentsia. The Russophiles promoted a bookish hybrid Ukrainian-Russian language (derogatorily dubbed yazychiie by its critics) and a cultural and political orientation toward Russia. From the 1870s they consistently lost ground to the narodovtsi (populists), who fostered the use of the vernacular and stressed the ethnic identity of Ukrainians in Austria-Hungary and in the Russian Empire. The narodovtsi developed an extensive press and founded numerous associations (starting with the Prosvita society in 1868) that provided an important outlet for writers and scholars in Russian-ruled Ukraine. Self-organization in the late 19th century extended to women’s and youth groups, performing ensembles, cooperatives and credit unions, and, in the 1890s, political parties. By this time, however, the Russophiles had been largely discredited (although they retained control of many key Ukrainian institutions in Galicia), and the leading role of the narodovtsi in the emerging Ukrainian national movement in Galicia was being challenged, though never eclipsed, by a patriotically minded radical movement, whose leading figures included Ivan Franko and Mykhailo Pavlyk.

At the turn of the century, the ethnic conflict in Galicia deepened. Massive peasant strikes against the Polish landlords occurred in 1902. Ukrainian university students engaged in demonstrations and clashes with the Poles, and in 1908 a student assassinated the Galician governor. The introduction in 1907 of universal manhood suffrage in elections to the Austrian parliament strengthened Ukrainian representation in Vienna and intensified pressures for a similar reform on the provincial level. Growing tensions with Russia prompted Vienna to seek a Ukrainian-Polish compromise, but Polish opposition kept the old curial electoral system in effect to the end.

By the outbreak of World War I, Ukrainians in Austrian Galicia were still an overwhelmingly agrarian and politically disadvantaged society. Nevertheless, they had made impressive educational and cultural advances, possessed a large native intelligentsia and an extensive institutional infrastructure, and had achieved a high level of national consciousness, all of which contrasted sharply with the situation prevailing in Russian-ruled Ukraine.

Bukovina of Ukraine

A small territory between the middle Dniester River and the main range of the Carpathians, Bukovina had formed part of Kyivan Rus and the Galician-Volhynian principality. In the 14th century it was incorporated into Moldavia, which in the 16th century became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire. At the time of its annexation by Austria in 1774, the population, Orthodox in religion, was binational, with Ukrainians predominating in the north and Romanians in the south.

The Habsburgs quickly instituted reforms similar to those in Galicia. Bukovina was joined to Galicia as a discrete district from 1787 to 1849, when it became a separate crownland; it achieved full autonomy in 1861. In the 19th century, sizable Jewish and German communities came into being as a result of immigration. German was the province’s official language; however, both Ukrainian and Romanian had currency in public life and, in certain disciplines, at the local university. Romanian-Ukrainian friction grew toward the end of the century over such issues as the Ukrainian attempts to gain parity in the Orthodox church administration, but it did not reach the level of hostility prevailing in Galicia.

From the late 1860s the Ukrainian national movement in Bukovina paralleled the developments in Galicia, with which there were close connections; a similar network of cultural and civic organizations and publishing enterprises was created. The provision of Ukrainian schools and educational facilities was superior to that of any other Ukrainian territory.

Transcarpathia

Lying south of the Carpathian Mountains, Transcarpathia was long isolated, both geographically and politically, from other ethnically Ukrainian lands. A domain of Kyivan Rus, after 1015 Transcarpathia was absorbed by Hungary, of which it remained a part for almost a millennium. With Hungary, it came in the 16th–17th centuries under the Habsburg dynasty. After the Union of Uzhhorod in 1646, on terms similar to the Union of Brest-Litovsk, the Uniate church became dominant in the religious sphere. Overwhelmingly rural in character, Transcarpathia had a Ukrainian (Ruthenian) peasantry, a powerful Hungarian landowning nobility, and a substantial number of urban and rural Jews. Under Hungary, Transcarpathia did not constitute a single administrative unit but was divided into counties governed by officials appointed from Budapest.

Social reforms initiated by Vienna in the late 18th century soon foundered on the shoals of Hungarian nobiliary opposition, and educational levels—at the time higher than in Galicia—began to decline in the early 19th century. However, ecclesiastical and cultural ties with Galicia remained strong until mid-century.

The 1848 revolution took a sharply nationalistic turn in Hungary, alienating many among its Slav minorities. Its suppression by Russian troops in 1849 stimulated pro-Russian sentiments among Transcarpathia’s intelligentsia and led to the emergence of Russophilism as the territory’s main cultural and political orientation. However, the political arrangement of 1867 (the Ausgleich) that created the dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy ceded control over internal policies to the Hungarian oligarchy. Increasing restrictions on the Ruthenian language in schools and publishing resulted in a growing tendency to Magyarization. Not until the turn of the 20th century did a Ukrainophile populist movement develop as a counterpoint to Russophilism and Magyarization. By the outbreak of World War I, Ukrainian national consciousness was still at a low level of development in Transcarpathia.

World War I and the struggle for independence

The outbreak of World War I and the onset of hostilities between Russia and Austria-Hungary on August 1, 1914, had immediate repercussions for the Ukrainian subjects of both belligerent powers. In the Russian Empire, Ukrainian publications and cultural organizations were directly suppressed and prominent figures arrested or exiled. As Russian forces advanced into Galicia in September, the retreating Austrians executed thousands for suspected pro-Russian sympathies. After occupying Galicia, tsarist authorities took steps toward its total incorporation into the Russian Empire. They prohibited the Ukrainian language, closed down institutions, and prepared to liquidate the Greek Catholic church. The Russification campaign was cut short by the Austrian reconquest in spring 1915. Western Ukraine, however, continued to be a theatre of military operations and suffered great depredation.

The Russian Revolution of February 1917 brought into power the Provisional Government, which promptly introduced freedom of speech and assembly and lifted the tsarist restrictions on minorities. National life in Ukraine quickened with the revival of a Ukrainian press and the formation of numerous cultural and professional associations, as well as political parties. In March, on the initiative of these new organizations, the Central Rada (“Council”) was formed in Kyiv as a Ukrainian representative body. In April the more broadly convened All-Ukrainian National Congress declared the Central Rada to be the highest national authority in Ukraine and elected the historian Mykhaylo Hrushevsky as its head. The stated goal of the Central Rada was territorial autonomy for Ukraine and the transformation of Russia into a democratic, federative republic. Although the Provisional Government recognized Ukraine’s right to autonomy and the Central Rada as a legitimate representative body, there were unresolved disputes over its territorial jurisdiction and political prerogatives. Locally, especially in the Russified cities of eastern Ukraine, the Rada also had to compete with the increasingly radical soviets of workers’ and soldiers’ deputies, whose support in the Ukrainian population, however, was quite limited.

Ukrainian-Russian relations deteriorated rapidly following the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd (now St. Petersburg) on November 7, 1917. The Central Rada refused to accept the new regime’s authority over Ukraine and on November 20 proclaimed the creation of the Ukrainian National Republic, though still in federation with the new democratic Russia that was expected to emerge from the impending Constituent Assembly. The Bolsheviks, in turn, at the first All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, held in Kharkiv in December, declared Ukraine to be a Soviet republic and formed a rival government. In January 1918 the Bolsheviks launched an offensive in the Left Bank and advanced on Kyiv. The Central Rada, already engaged in peace negotiations with the Central Powers, from whom it hoped for military assistance, proclaimed the total independence of Ukraine on January 22; on the same day, it passed a law establishing national autonomy for Ukraine’s Jewish, Russian, and Polish minorities. Almost immediately, however, the government had to evacuate to the Right Bank, as Soviet troops occupied Kyiv. On February 9 Ukraine and the Central Powers signed the Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (see treaties of Brest-Litovsk). A German-Austrian offensive dislodged the Bolsheviks from Kyiv in early March, and the Rada government returned to the capital. In April the Red Army retreated from Ukraine.

The socialist policies of the Ukrainian government, especially land nationalization, conflicted with the interest of the German high command to maximize the production of foodstuffs for its own war effort. On April 29, 1918, the Rada government was overthrown in a German-supported coup by Gen. Pavlo Skoropadsky. A collateral descendant of an 18th-century Cossack hetman, Skoropadsky assumed the title “hetman of Ukraine” (which he intended to become hereditary), abrogated all laws passed by the Rada, and established a conservative regime that relied on the support of landowners and the largely Russian urban middle class. The new government aroused intense opposition among Ukrainian nationalists, socialists, and the peasantry. To coordinate political opposition, the Ukrainian National Union was formed by the main parties and civic organizations, while the peasants manifested their hostility through rebellions and partisan warfare. The capitulation of Germany and Austria in November removed the main prop of Skoropadsky’s regime, and the Ukrainian National Union formed the Directory of the Ukrainian National Republic to prepare for his overthrow. In a bid for the support of the Allied powers, Skoropadsky announced his intention to join in federation with a future non-Bolshevik Russia, triggering an uprising. On December 14 the hetman abdicated, and the Directory assumed control of government in Kyiv.

Even before the collapse of Austria-Hungary, an assembly of western Ukrainian political leaders in October 1918 declared the formation of a state, shortly thereafter named the Western Ukrainian National Republic, embracing Galicia, northern Bukovina, and Transcarpathia. On November 1 Ukrainian forces occupied Lviv. This act touched off a war with the Poles, who were themselves resolved to incorporate Galicia into a reconstituted Polish state. The Poles took Lviv on November 21, but most of Galicia remained under Ukrainian control, and the government, headed by Yevhen Petrushevych, transferred its seat to Stanyslaviv (now Ivano-Frankivsk). On January 22, 1919, an act of union of the two Ukrainian states was proclaimed in Kyiv, but actual political integration was prevented by the ongoing hostilities. These ultimately took an unfavourable turn for the Ukrainians, and by late July the Poles were in full control of Galicia. Petrushevych and his government evacuated to Right Bank Ukraine and in the autumn went into exile in Vienna, where they continued diplomatic efforts against recognition of the Polish occupation.

In Kyiv the Directory that had taken power in December 1918—initially headed by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and from February 1919 by Symon Petlyura, who was also the commander in chief—officially restored the Ukrainian National Republic and revived the legislation of the Central Rada. Its attempts to establish an effective administration and to cope with the mounting economic and social problems were stymied, however, by the increasingly chaotic domestic situation and a hostile foreign environment. As the peasants became restless and the army demoralized, partisan movements led by unruly chieftains (commonly known as otamany) escalated in scope and violence. In addition, a substantial irregular force emerged under the command of the charismatic anarchist leader Nestor Makhno. In many places the government’s authority was nominal or nonexistent. The Allied powers, including France, whose expeditionary force held Odessa, supported the Russian Whites, whose army was grouping around Gen. Anton Denikin in southern Russia.

As authority broke down in Ukraine, random violence increased. In particular, a ferocious wave of pogroms against the Jewish population left tens of thousands dead. The majority of the pogroms occurred in 1919, perpetrated by virtually all regular and irregular forces fighting in Ukraine—including Directory troops, the otamany, the White forces, and the Red Army—as well as civilians from both the peasant and landowning classes.

The Bolsheviks had already launched a new offensive in eastern Ukraine in December 1918. In February 1919 they again seized Kyiv. The Directory moved to the Right Bank and continued the struggle. In May Denikin launched his campaign against the Bolsheviks in the Left Bank; his progress westward through Ukraine was marked by terror, restoration of gentry landownership, and the destruction of all manifestations of Ukrainian national life. As the Bolsheviks retreated yet again, Petlyura’s Ukrainian forces and Denikin’s White regiments both entered Kyiv on August 31, though the Ukrainians soon withdrew to avoid overt hostilities. From September to December the Ukrainian army fought with Denikin but, losing ground, began a retreat northwestward into Volhynia. There, confronted by the Poles in the west, the returning Red Army in the north, and the Whites in the south, the Ukrainian forces ceased regular military operations and turned to guerrilla warfare. In December Petlyura went to Warsaw to seek outside support. At the same time, the Bolsheviks were beating back Denikin’s forces, and on December 16 they recaptured Kyiv. By February 1920 the Whites had been expelled from Ukrainian territory.

Petlyura’s negotiations with the Polish government of Józef Piłsudski culminated in the Treaty of Warsaw, signed in April 1920; by the terms of the agreement, in return for Polish military aid, Petlyura surrendered Ukraine’s claim to Galicia and western Volhynia. A Polish-Ukrainian campaign opened two days later, and on May 6 the joint forces occupied Kyiv. A counteroffensive mounted by the Bolsheviks brought them to the outskirts of Warsaw in August. The tides of war turned again as the Polish and Ukrainian armies drove back the Soviets and reentered the Right Bank. In October, however, Poland made a truce with the Soviets, and in March 1921 the Polish and Soviet sides signed the Treaty of Riga. Poland extended recognition to Soviet Ukraine and retained the annexed western Ukrainian lands. (See also Russian Civil War; Russo-Polish War.)

Ukraine in the interwar period

In the aftermath of World War I and the revolutionary upheavals that followed, Ukrainian territories were divided among four states. Bukovina was annexed to Romania. Transcarpathia was joined to the new country of Czechoslovakia. Poland incorporated Galicia and western Volhynia, together with smaller adjacent areas in the northwest. The lands east of the Polish border constituted Soviet Ukraine.