Fitzgerald Inquiry: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION.

SECTION: 10.2

A new entity is recommended, to be known as the Criminal Justice Commission, (CJC). It will be permanently charged with the monitoring, reviewing, co-ordinating and initiating reform of the administration of criminal justice. It will also fulfill those criminal justice functions not appropriately carried out by the police or other agencies.

The CJC will report:

• on a regular basis;
• when instructed to do so;
• when it decides it is necessary to do so.

This report has already detailed some of the priorities for review by the CJC. The range of matters that require attention is broad, and a programme of review and reform needs to be drawn up as one of the CJC’s first tasks.

The permanent role of the CJC will include:

• acquisition of the resources, skills, training and leadership necessary for the administration of criminal justice;
• advising the Parliament on the implementation of the recommendations in this report relating to criminal justice and the Police Force, particularly those matters set out for the CJC’s consideration;
• monitoring and reporting on the use and effectiveness of investigative powers;
• providing Parliament with regular reports on the effectiveness of criminal justice administration, with particular reference to the incidence and prevention of crime with special emphasis on organized crime, and the efficiency of law enforcement by the Police Force;
• monitoring the performance of the Police Force to ensure that the most appropriate policing methods are being used, consistent with trends in the nature and incidence of crime, and the ability of the Police Force to respond;
• monitoring the use, suitability and sufficiency of law enforcement resources and the sufficiency of funding of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies (including the Director of Prosecutions and Public Defender’s respective offices);
• providing the Commissioner of Police with policy directives based on CJC research, investigation and analysis. These directives would cover law enforcement priorities, police education and training, revised methods of police operation and the optimum use of law enforcement resources;
• overseeing the reform of the Police Force;
• researching, generating and reporting to Parliament on proposals for reform of the criminal law and law relating to the enforcement of or the administration of criminal justice, including assessment of relevant initiatives and systems elsewhere;
• undertaking essential criminal justice functions which are not appropriately carried out by police or other agencies. Apart from research and co-ordination of criminal law reform processes, these would include witness protection and investigation of official misconduct in public institutions;
• overseeing criminal intelligence matters and managing criminal intelligence with specific significance to major crime, organized crime and official misconduct.

A standing parliamentary committee, not charged with any other responsibility and known as the “Criminal Justice Committee” should oversee the operations of the CJC. The membership of the committee should reflect the balance of power in the Legislative Assembly. The Criminal Justice Committee should have the power to formulate policies and guidelines to be obeyed by the CJC, and to direct the CJC to initiate and pursue investigations or to report to the Parliament. Whilst the Criminal Justice Committee should be entitled to be informed of the basis on which any investigation or category of investigation is being undertaken, it should not have the power to prevent or hinder any investigation by the CJC, (or any of its organs or officers), or do more than require the CJC to review a decision to carry out any investigation. The exclusion or reduction of party political considerations and processes from the decision-making process with respect to the administration of criminal justice is an important consideration underlying the establishment of the CJC. Accordingly, executive authority and connection with the CJC must be limited to what is necessary to finance it, provide administrative and resource needs, and that necessary for public financial and other accounting purposes. For those purposes, but not otherwise, a Minister should be responsible for the CJC. Subject to what is later said about transitional arrangements, which Minister should be responsible for the CJC depends upon adoption of the earlier recommendation in respect of the role and office of the Attorney-General. If the Attorney-General’s ministerial responsibilities are changed as recommended earlier in this report, the Attorney-General should be responsible for the CJC.

Otherwise the Premier or a Minister assisting the Premier (with no other responsibility) should be responsible for the CJC. The CJC should report to the Criminal Justice Committee. In contrast to the position of the Electoral and Administrative Review Commission, many of the matters to be the subject of report by the CJC, including some of its operational priorities and methods and the subject matters of its concern, may need to be confidential. In consequence, the reporting of the CJC should not be to the Parliament in the first instance, and, in some cases, not at all.The Criminal Justice Committee’s members should all be subject to specific obligations of confidentiality.The Criminal Justice Committee must have the power to conduct hearings in camera. It should decide what material matters reported to it can be reported to and tabled in the Parliament and when that is to be done. Some matters may never be tabled. However, that should not prevent the necessary, effective and sufficient oversight of the operations, methods and priorities of the CJC being had by the Criminal Justice Committee, against the background of the constitution of the CJC and reinforced by the checks and balances within it.