Extract from ABC News
Analysis
As the one-year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine approaches, its army has commenced the preliminary phase of its 2023 offensives.
Over the past week, Russia has conducted attacks at Svatove, Soledar, Donetsk city, Bakhmut, Dvorichna, Vuhledar and other locations. These are unlikely to comprise the main campaign that many in the Russian military blogger community have hoped for, and that Ukrainian intelligence officials have warned about.
Assuming there is a larger Russian campaign plan at work, these recent attacks are likely to have been probes and "reconnaissance in force" missions to ascertain or test the Ukrainian strengths, dispositions and reactions.
In an era of advanced technology, some may wonder why such probes are still required. The reality is that despite the ability of satellites, reconnaissance drones and electronic warfare to provide insights into an enemy's locations, their true strength and will on the ground can only be determined on the ground.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his military began to assemble the pieces of the 2023 offensives late last year. As a result of the casualties suffered in the first six months of the war, Putin announced a partial mobilisation on September 21, 2022. This provides the personnel and industrial capacity to enable military campaigns in 2023.
Then, in order to provide the political rationale for his war and the forthcoming offensives, he announced the annexation of Ukrainian territory in late September.
The final piece of this puzzle was the changes in command announced in early January. By placing General Valery Gerasimov in overall command in Ukraine, Putin hopes to see more offensive action than under his defensively minded predecessor, General Sergey Surovikin.
What's behind Russia's campaign?
Why is Russia beginning these offensive activities in Ukraine now? There are three reasons.
The first and most important is political. Putin needs a victory. His forces over the past 12 months have suffered battlefield defeats in the north, south and east of Ukraine.
Concurrently, the strategic missile campaign to terrorise Ukrainians by targeting their power infrastructure has resulted in no political accommodations from Ukraine's leader. Instead, it has resulted in increased Western assistance such as economic aid, munitions, tanks and air defence systems.
Putin needs offensives to take ground and generate momentum in Ukraine as well as in the global influence battle. And he has to demonstrate to the Russian people by the first anniversary of his invasion that progress is being made against an enemy he describes as "neo-Nazis and a West intent on destroying Russia".
A second reason Russia has commenced the preliminary operations for its offensives is to disrupt future Ukrainian offensives. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has outlined in multiple speeches his intention to take back all Ukrainian territory occupied by Russia, including Crimea. So, to force the Ukrainians to use their military to defend against Russian attacks instead of conducting their own offensives, the Russians will use their assaults in the coming weeks to spoil at least some of the Ukrainian 2023 offensives.
Finally, the Russian high command will want to ensure Russian forces are in a better position, in the east and south of Ukraine, to hold more defensible ground before the full effect of recent Western donations of tanks, armoured vehicles and munitions can be brought to bear by the Ukrainians.
The large amount of Western aid announced in January will soon begin arriving in Ukraine. It will take some time for new equipment to be fully absorbed into Ukrainian army formations. But, by the second quarter of 2023, Ukraine's offensive potential will probably be much greater than it was when it conducted its Kharkiv and Kherson offensives late last year.
An uneasy time for the Ukrainian high command
Despite their desire to regain the initiative, Russia's offensive potential is questionable. While there has been a large influx of mobilised Russian troops, their most important impact on this war is likely to have been the stabilisation of the Russian defensive line over winter. The time of peak pressure on the Russians was in October and November, which is when large numbers of mobilised troops arrived to fill out depleted Russian units.
Offensive operations are a very different concern. These require well trained and equipped soldiers and top-notch leaders, as well as detailed planning and rehearsals at all levels. Tens of thousands of new, inexperienced soldiers injected into an exhausted and depleted Russian army will not provide this capability.
So, when the Russians commence their main offensive operations in the coming weeks and months, they are unlikely to achieve a bold operational breakthrough where they penetrate deep into Ukrainian territory, destroying logistics, artillery and headquarters and dislocating the Ukrainian defensive line.
The Russians no longer possess either the quantity of well-trained conventional forces this would require, nor the ability to exercise the on-the-spot initiative to rapidly exploit any Ukrainian tactical failures. The Russian army's losses in leaders, equipment and confidence of the past year will mitigate against this.
What we are more likely to witness in the coming weeks is a series of rolling Russian attacks across many parts of the eastern front. From Svatove in the north to Vuhledar in the south, Russian forces are likely to conduct battalion and brigade-sized attacks. These will probably be a mix of human wave and combined arms activities — something the Russians have previewed in their attacks around Bakhmut and Soledar.
Ukraine has been preparing for their own offensives for some time. With the arrival of new Western equipment in the coming weeks, it should be ready to launch them soon.
However, they must carefully balance defending their territory, with its attendant political and military considerations, with the preservation and capacity building of the Ukrainian army for their own offensives to come. The coming weeks will be an uneasy time for the Ukrainian high command.
Mick Ryan is a strategist and recently retired Australian Army major general. He served in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, and as a strategist on the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. His first book, War Transformed, is about 21st century warfare.
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