The palace letters reveal a litany of depredations in the most extraordinary undermining of elected government
If
you thought Sir John Kerr’s reputation couldn’t sink any lower, think
again. The palace letters have brought Kerr’s extensive, even obsessive,
“reporting” to the Queen into sharp relief, placing Kerr himself and
his peculiar conception of his role as governor general under intense
scrutiny. They have not held up well.
In letters ranging from deferential to obsequious, Kerr is revealed as insecure, indiscreet, easily led by flattery, and expertly played by the supercilious, seasoned palace courtier, the Queen’s private secretary Sir Martin Charteris. And the constant theme throughout is Kerr’s disparaging of the government and the prime minister, Gough Whitlam. Never was a man less suited to the position of governor general.
In letters ranging from deferential to obsequious, Kerr is revealed as insecure, indiscreet, easily led by flattery, and expertly played by the supercilious, seasoned palace courtier, the Queen’s private secretary Sir Martin Charteris. And the constant theme throughout is Kerr’s disparaging of the government and the prime minister, Gough Whitlam. Never was a man less suited to the position of governor general.
From his first letter of 15 August 1974, barely a month into the job, Kerr cavils against the government over the proclamation for the historic joint sitting of parliament, disputing the advice from the solicitor general, the head of attorney general’s department and the former attorney general, that six bills could be put before the joint sitting. Kerr knew better, telling the Queen that he “was highly doubtful” this was correct. The high court soon found otherwise.
This was just the first of a litany of depredations in what can only be seen as the most extraordinary vice-regal undermining of elected government. Kerr rails against policy decisions, queries appointments and reveals details of executive council meetings – the most important and highly confidential meetings of executive government. By 1975 he has moved from doubting the government to openly disputing it, including even Whitlam’s advice to him as governor general, advice he is bound to take. In an astonishing letter of 4 January 1975, Kerr asks Charteris to advise him on “ways of handling” matters with Whitlam.
There is a touch of the absurd and arcane in Kerr’s simpering concern over whether he ought to wear “full morning dress and decorations” at his swearing in (Whitlam had suggested lounge suit). Charteris assured him that he was “right to wear morning dress”; or whether “the curtesy by ladies” should continue in his quasi-regal presence; whether there should be four or six bars in the vice-regal salute; and the order of precedence for dignitaries.
Far more serious are discussions about the possible use of the reserve powers, and it is in these letters that the political dimension of the palace letters is laid bare. A defining feature of a constitutional monarchy is that the monarch must remain “strictly neutral” in relation to political matters. Yet time and again these letters show that the Queen engaged in intensely political discussions with the governor general, including the existence and possible use of the reserve powers against the government. Far from remaining above politics, it is difficult to imagine a greater level of political involvement than this.
"Government is simply side-stepped as Kerr asks for and is given advice by the Queen through her private secretary"
On 24 September 1975, Charteris points Kerr to the work of Canadian senator Eugene Forsey on the reserve powers, noting Forsey’s “principle” that “if Supply is refused that always makes it constitutionally proper to grant a dissolution”. Forsey’s knowledge of Australian political matters can be gauged from the fact that he disputed there was any such thing as a half Senate election. “He could find no mention of such an election in the Australian constitution”, the Canadian High Commission reported. The wording of s. 13 had apparently eluded him, yet this is the “expert” Charteris urged upon Kerr.
The following week Kerr writes that he is concerned that any decision he makes could “affect the Monarchy in Australia” and – in stark contrast to his refusal to accept the advice of the government – he asks Charteris for “any observations … which … should be taken into account in the interests of the Monarchy in Australia”. Just why the interests of the monarchy should be taken into account in a decision of the governor general of Australia regarding the possible use of the reserve powers is not clear. Nevertheless, this is what Kerr and Charteris discussed.
These letters provide the essential context for the two pivotal letters which then follow from the Queen, through Charteris. On 4 November 1975, Charteris tells Kerr in no uncertain terms that the contested and controversial reserve powers do exist. There was no mention of the advice Kerr had received from the law officers, the solicitor general and attorney general, against that view. In a letter the next day, Charteris makes an even more direct reference to the use of the reserve powers, specifically assuaging Kerr’s concern that any decision he made might affect the monarchy: “If you do, as you will, what the constitution dictates, you cannot possibly do the Monarchy any avoidable harm. The chances are you will do it good.”
What is absent throughout these letters is any recognition from either Charteris or Kerr of the governor general’s most fundamental duty, to act on the advice of elected government, specifically the prime minister. Instead, government is simply side-stepped as Kerr asks for and is given advice by the Queen, through her private secretary, at times contrary to Whitlam’s advice, even on the existence and use of the reserve powers.
These letters, with their clear and direct political prescription, make a mockery of the claim that the Queen played “no part” in the decision that Kerr then made just days later.
• Jenny Hocking is a professor in the National Centre for Australian Studies, Monash University, and author of Gough Whitlam: A Moment in History; Gough Whitlam: His Time; and The Dismissal Dossier: Everything You Were Never Meant to Know About November 1975
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